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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
William Oser appeals from the denial of his request for appointment of
counsel at government expense entered in conjunction with the dismissal of his
successive petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
A jury convicted Oser of trafficking in methamphetamine and delivery of a
controlled substance and his conviction was affirmed on appeal. State v. Oser,
2009 Unpublished Opinion No. 362, Docket No. 35228 (Idaho App., February 18,
2009) (Appendix A).

The evidence leading to Oser's conviction for trafficking

was as follows:
Following an investigation, the Boise police department
obtained and executed a warrant to search Oser's residence. At
the time of the search, four individuals were present in the
residence, including Oser. In the kitchen, officers located and
seized a pipe, police scanner, electric scale and a gray box
containing more pipes, another scale and methamphetamine. Oser
admitted to officers that the methamphetamine in the box was his.
A pipe was located beneath a television console. In the south
bedroom/computer room, officers located and seized a drawer full
of drug-packaging materials, another pipe, a radio scanner, digital
scales, and a baggie with approximately 28.73 grams of
methamphetamine which was located on the floor underneath a
computer desk. Oser denied that the methamphetamine under the
computer desk was his. A utility bill addressed to Oser, a piece of
mail addressed to Oser and a drug ledger were found on the
computer desk. A black purse, containing methamphetamine and a
cell phone bearing the name of one of the occupants of the
residence at the time of the search were aiso located in the
computer room.
Id. at 1-2.

Oser did not challenge on appeal his conviction for delivering

methamphetamine to a confidential informant, which was part of the investigation
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leading to the search warrant.

generally Oser, 2009 Unpublished Opinion

No. 362.
Oser filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was denied. (R., pp.
4-5, 44, 48; see also #37864 R., pp. 5-8, 107-09, 175-80. 1)

With this post-

conviction petition Oser submitted recordings he alleged were of the police
officers executing the search warrant at his residence and Oser's own
transcription, largely by hand, of what he claims was said, in support of his claim
that the officers executing the warrant had stated that there were no drugs in
Oser's residence. (#37864 R., pp. 10-11, 14-58.) The state presented evidence
that the transcription was "clearly incomplete and inaccurate." (#37864 R., pp.
156-58.) The state specifically argued that the only potential use of the recording
was for impeachment because all other uses would be hearsay, and that the
recording was not useful for that purpose. (#37864 R., p. 163.) The court, in
dismissing this claim, noted that it had reviewed the tape at the time of the trial
and concluded it likely had no admissible value, although it had made no final
ruling on admissibility at the trial.

(#37864 R., p. 178 (Appendix B).)

Oser

appealed from the summary dismissal of his petition, but then voluntarily
dismissed the appeal. (#37864 Motion to Dismiss Appeal (filed April 20, 2011);
Order Granting Motion to Dismiss (entered April 26, 2011 ); Remittitur (filed April
28, 2011 ).)

1

On April 13, 2012, the Court took judicial notice of the record and transcript in
Docket No. 37864.
2

A little more than two weeks

the voluntary dismissal of the appeal in

the first post-conviction action Oser filed a successive petition, initiating the
instant action. (R., pp. 3-7.) In his petition and accompanying documents Oser
alleged that police officers had testified

inconsistently with

unattributed

statements in Oser's transcriptions of the tape recordings made during the
search; that his trial counsel had failed to bring that out at the trial; and that his
post-conviction counsel had "failed to raise" or "failed to adequately raise" these
claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

(R., pp. 5, 10-17.)

Oser

submitted excerpts from the alleged transcription of the recordings previously
submitted in support of his first post-conviction petition, with additional handwritten comments (apparently inserted by Oser), to claim that unidentified police
officers stated that the drugs present at Oser's house were put there by one of
the other persons in the house before police arrived to execute the search
warrant. (R., pp. 11-12, 21-30; compare #37864 R., pp. 32-33, 36-37, 44-49.)
Oser also asserted as new claims an allegation that the probable cause affidavit
in support of the search warrant "does not exist or was withheld from the
defense" and that the same probable cause affidavit that does not exist or was
withheld was "obtained as a result of Police misconduct." (R., pp. 5, 17-19.) In
the petition Oser asked for appointment of counsel. (R., p. 6;

p. 40.)

The state moved to dismiss the successive petition on three bases. First,
the petition was untimely because it was filed more than two years after the
remittitur issued in the underlying criminal case. (R., pp. 47-48.) Second, the
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petition was barred by the statutory prohibition against successive petitions. (R.,
p. 48.) Finally, the claims in the petition lacked merit. (R.. p. 48.)
The district court first denied Oser's request for counsel, finding that Oser
had fully set forth his allegations despite the lack of counsel but that the
allegations were still inadequate to set forth a cognizable claim for relief. (R., p.
51.) The district court then granted the state's motion to dismiss. (R., p. 52.)
Oser filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 54-56.)

4

ISSUE
Oser states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Oser's motion for
appointment of post-conviction counsel?
(Appellant's brief, p. 5.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Oser failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his request for counsel to pursue his frivolous successive petition?

5

ARGUMENT
Oser Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Denying His Request For Counsel Because His Successive Petition Is Frivolous
A.

Introduction
Oser's successive petition is frivolous because it is barred by the statute of

limitation and is barred by the statutory prohibition on successive petitions. Oser
does not argue that he set forth sufficient facts to merit a hearing but instead
argues on appeal that that he asserted facts sufficient to warrant appointment of
counsel to represent him on his claims related to ineffective assistance of trial
counsel. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-19.) Oser does not argue on appeal that the
newly asserted challenges to the search warrant merited appointment of counsel.
(Id.)
Because Oser has not claimed that the newly asserted challenges to the
search warrant required the appointment of counsel, Oser has effectively
conceded lack of error in the dismissal of those claims.

The state therefore

requests that this Court affirm the district court's ruling as to those claims and will
not address them further.
As to the appellate argument that Oser did set forth sufficiently colorable
claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel to merit appointment of postconviction counsel, application of the law to the record supports the district
court's order denying appointment of counsel because the claims are clearly
barred by the statute of limitation and the statutory waiver of claims not asserted
in the original post-conviction action.

6

B.

Standard Of Review
The decision

to

or deny a

represent a post-conviction petitioner

court-appointed counsel to
§ 19-4904 is discretionary.

Plant v. State, 143 Idaho 758, 761, 152 P.3d 629, 632 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789,792,102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004); Foxv.
State, 129 Idaho 881, 885, 934 P.2d 947, 951 (Ct. App. 1997)). "In reviewing the
denial of a motion for appointment of counsel in post-conviction proceedings,
'[tJhis Court will not set aside the trial court's findings of fact unless they are
clearly erroneous. As to questions of law, this Court exercises free review."'
Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792, 102 P.3d at 1111 (internal citations omitted).

C.

Because His Petition Is Barred, Oser Has Failed To Show Error In The
District Court's Denial Of His Request For Counsel
A request for appointment of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding is

governed by I.C. § 19-4904.

If the petitioner qualifies financially and "alleges

facts showing the possibility of a valid claim that would require further
investigation on the defendant's behalf," the court must appoint post-conviction
counsel to assist the petitioner in developing his or her claims. Swader v. State,
143 Idaho 651,654,152 P.3d 12, 15 (2007); Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho
789, 793, 102 P.3d 1108, 1112 (2004). If, on the other hand, the claims in the
petition are so patently frivolous that there appears no possibility that they could
be developed into a viable claim even with the assistance of counsel and further
investigation, the court may deny the request for counsel and proceed with the
usual procedure for dismissing meritless post-conviction petitions. Workman v.
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State, 144 Idaho 518, 529, 164 P.3d 798, 809 (2007); Hust v. State, 147 Idaho
682, 684, 214 P.3d 668, 670 (Ct. App. 2009).
Application of these legal standards to the facts of this case shows no
abuse of discretion.

Oser failed to alleged facts rising even to the level of

showing the possibility of a valid claim; his petition was therefore frivolous and
his request for court-appointed counsel properly denied.

1.

Oser's Petition Was Frivolous Because It Was Barred By The
Statute Of Limitation

A petition for post-conviction relief must be filed "within one (1) year ...
from the determination of an appeal." I.C. § 19-4902(a). Successive petitions
asserting newly discovered claims need not be filed within the one-year limitation
period of I.C. § 19-4902(a). Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d
870, 874 (2007); Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d 1066, 1069
(2009). Because I.C. § 19--4908 contemplates successive petitions to assert a
claim where that claim "for sufficient reason was not asserted or was
inadequately raised," the statute contemplates that claims not known to
petitioners would be raised beyond the one-year limitation period. Charboneau,
144 Idaho at 904-05, 174 P.3d at 874-75; Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 250, 220 P.3d
at 1069. Claims that "raise important due process issues" that were "not known
to the defendant" within the one-year limitation period of I.C. § 19--4902(a) can
therefore be brought within a reasonable time of their discovery. Rhoades, 148
Idaho at 250-51, 220 P.3d at 1069-70. "In determining what a reasonable time is
for filing a successive petition, we will simply consider it on a case-by-case basis,
as has been done in capital cases." Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 905, 174 P.3d at
8

also Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 251, 220 P.3d at 1
however, ineffective assistance of counsel claims "should
immediately upon completion of the trial." Rhoades, 148 Idaho at

220 P

at 1072.
Here there is no dispute that Oser did not file within one year of the
remittitur in his underlying criminal case.

(See R., pp. 47-48.)

His claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel relate to counsel's performance at trial. (R., p.
5.) Because Oser was aware or reasonably should have been aware of the facts
underlying his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel within the one-year
statute of limitation period he was not entitled to any tolling of the period to bring
his claims. Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 253, 220 P.3d at 1072 (claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel in conducting a trial are generally known "upon completion
of the trial").
On appeal Oser argues only that he filed within a "reasonable time" of his
voluntarily dismissal of the appeal in his first post-conviction action. (Appellant's
brief, p. 13.)

Because the relevant legal standard is whether Oser filed his

successive petition within a reasonable time of discovery of the asserted claim,
Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 250-51, 220 P.3d at 1069-70, Oser's appellate argument
is irrelevant.
Oser was or should reasonably have been aware of his counsel's actions
at trial, and therefore he did not bring his claims either within a year or within a
reasonable time of their discovery. Because there is no potential reading of the
alleged facts that would make the new claim of ineffective assistance of trial
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counsel timely raised, this claim is frivolous. Oser has failed to show error in the
district court's order denying counsel for the successive petition.
2.

Oser's Claims Are Frivolous Because His Petition Is Barred By The
Statute Prohibiting Successive Petitions

The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act ("UPCPA") provides: "All
grounds for relief available to an applicant under this act must be raised in his
original, supplemental or amended application." I.C. § 19-4908. A successive
petition is allowed only if "the court finds a ground for relief asserted [in the
successive petition) which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was
inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended application." I.C. §
19-4908; see also Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 932, 933-34, 801 P .2d 1283, 128485 (1990); Nguyen v. State, 126 Idaho 494, 496, 887 P .2d 39, 41 (Ct. App.
1994).

In interpreting I.C. § 19-4908, Idaho's appellate courts have held that

"[i)neffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel may provide sufficient
reason for permitting newly asserted allegations or allegations inadequately
raised in the initial application to be raised in a subsequent post-conviction
application." Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 189, 177 P.3d 400,403 (Ct. App.
2008) (footnote omitted) (citing Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 596, 635 P.2d
955, 960 (1981); Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 798, 992 P.2d 789, 793 (Ct.
App. 1999)).
Review of the record shows that Oser did not allege even a potentially
meritorious alegation that the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims
asserted in his successive petition were either not asserted or inadequately
raised due to the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel.
10

In his first

petition for post-conviction relief Oser asserted his trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to lay adequate foundation for the admission of tapes his fiancee
allegedly made while police searched Oser's residence.

(#37864 R., p. 176

(Appendix B).) This claim was summarily dismissed because the district court
concluded that the record in the underlying criminal case showed that counsel in
fact had laid the available foundation for admission of the tape but, after listening
to the tape itself, the trial court had concluded that it was inadmissible. (#37864
R., p. 178 (Appendix B).)

In his successive petition Oser alleged that his post-conviction counsel
was ineffective for presenting the claim that Oser had actually alleged in his
petition (the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to lay foundation).
(R., pp. 10-11.)

Oser alleged that post-conviction counsel, after reviewing the

tapes and the trial transcript, should not have asserted the claim Oser had raised
related to failure to lay foundation, but should instead have presented what trial
counsel "should have done differently," which was

(1) discover alleged

discrepancies between alleged statements on the tapes and what police officers
testified to at trial; (2) impeach the officers with the alleged discrepancies; and (3)
present the testimony of witnesses who allegedly would have confirmed that
events did not transpire as testified to by the officers. (R., pp. 10-17.)
Review of the record thus establishes that Oser alleged a different claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel in his successive petition than raised in the
original petition. His claim in the successive petition was that counsel in the first
post-conviction action should have recognized that Oser was attempting to raise
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the wrong claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and raised new, or at
least different, claims. This assertion fails, however, because "'the petitioner is
not entitled to have counsel appointed in order to search the record for possible
nonfrivolous claims."'

Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 654, 152 P.3d 12, 15

(2007) (quoting Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 679, 23 P.3d 138, 141 (2001)).
Because prior post-conviction counsel had no duty to scour the record for
potential claims or amendments, the fact that Oser has concluded, after the
dismissal of the claims he raised in original petition, that different claims should
have been raised is insufficient to present a nonfrivolous reason why his claims
are not barred as successive.
3.

Conclusion

The theory behind Oser's original post-conviction petition was that police
found no controlled substances and therefore must have planted the evidence
against him.

(#37864 R., p. 178 (Appendix B).)

His theory in the successive

petition is that a third party had planted the evidence with police knowledge and
collusion.

(R., pp. 5, 10-17.)

Both theories are based on his own personal,

dubious claims of what recordings of the search contain. His successive petition
is nothing more than an untimely attempt to amend his original petition to present
alternative theories. The petition is barred as untimely and successive. There is
no possibility that the claims asserted in the successive petition could be dressed
with viability even with the assistance of counsel and further investigation.
Therefore Oser has failed on appeal to show error in the denial of his request for
counsel.

12

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order
denying appointment of counsel.

DATED this 17th day of April, 2012.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 17th day of April 2012, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
addressed to:
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

KKJ/pm
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APPENDIX A

RECEIVED
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 35228
STATE OF IDAHO,

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.

WILLIAM ALLEN OSER,

Defendant-Appellant.

FEB 1 8 2009

A.HORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
CRIMINAL DIVISION

2009 Unpublished Opinion No. 362

Filed: February 18, 2009
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
OPINION AND SHALL NOT
BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho) Ada
County. Hon. Ronald J. Wilper, District Judge.
Judgment of conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine or amphetamine and
delivery of a controlled substance, affirmed.
Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Eric D. Fredericksen, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Nicole· L. Schafer, Deputy
Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
GRATTON, Judge
William Allen Oser appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon the jury
verdict finding hlm guilty of trafficking in methamphetamine or amphetamine and delivery of a
controlled substance. We affirm.

I.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURE
Following an investigation, the Boise police department obtained and executed a warrant
to search Oser's residence.

At the time of the search, four individuals were present in the

residence, including Oser. In the kitchen, officers located and seized a pipe, police scanner,
electric scale and.a gray box containing more pipes, another scale and methamphetamine. Oser
admitted to officers that the methamphetamine in the box was his. A pipe was located beneath a
television console. In the south bedroom/computer room, officers located and seized a drawer
full of drug-packaging materials, another pipe, a radio scanner, digital scales, and a baggie with
1

approximately 28. 73 grams of methamphetarnine which was located on the floor underneath a
computer desk. Oser denied that the methamphetamine under the computer desk was his. A
utility bill addressed to Oser, a piece of mail addressed to Oser and a drug ledger were found on
the computer desk. A black purse, containing methamphetamine and a cell phone bearing the
name of one of the occupants of the residence at the time of the search were also located in the
computer room.
Oser was charged with trafficking in methamphetamine or amphetamine, LC. § 372732B(a), and delivery of a controlled substance, LC. § 37-2732(a). Following a trial, the jury
found Oser guilty on both charges. The district court imposed a unified sentence of twenty
years, with a fixed term of six years, for each conviction, to be served concurrently. This appeal
followed.

II.
ANALYSIS
Oser contends that his right to a fair trial was violated by prosecutorial misconduct,
specifically, that the prosecutor misstated the law of constructive possession in his closing
argument to the jury. In addition, Oser argues that, even though his trial counsel did not object
to the statements of the prosecutor, and thus failed to preserve the issue for appeal, this Court
should, nonetheless, consider the issue on appeal as fundamental error. Oser claims that the
statement made by the prosecutor was fundamental error because it had the effect of lowering the
State's burden of proof.
Closing argument serves to sharpen and clarify the issues for resolution by the trier of
fact in a criminal case. State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. App. 2007).
Its purpose is to enlighten the jury and to help the jurors remember and interpret the evidence.

Id.; State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 450, 816 P.2d 1002, 1007 (Ct. App. 1991). Both sides
have traditionally been afforded considerable latitude in closing argument to the jury and are
entitled to discuss fully, from their respective standpoints, the evidence and the inferences to be
drawn therefrom. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969 (2003); Phillips, 144
Idaho at 86, 156 P.3d at 587,
Closing argument should not include counsel's personal opinions and beliefs about the
credibility of a witness or the guilt or innocence of the accused. Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86, 156
P.3d at 587. See also State v. Garcia, 100 Idaho 108, 110-11, 594 P.2d 146, 148-49 (1979);
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State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 14, 909 P.2d 624, 632 (Ct. App. 1995); State v. Ames, 109 Idaho

373, 376, 707 P.2d 484, 487 (Ct App. 1985). A prosecuting attorney may express an opL11ion in
argument as to the tmt.h or falsity of testimony or the guilt of the defendant when such opinion is
based upon the evidence, but the prosecutor should exercise caution to avoid interjecting his or
her personal beiief and should ex?licitly state that the opinion is based solely on inferences from
evidence presented at trial. Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86 n.1, 156 P.3d at 587 n.1. The safer course
is for a prosecutor to avoid the statement of opinion, as well as the disfavored phrases "I think"
and "I believe" altogether. Id.
Appeals to emotion, passion, or prejudice of the jury through the use of inflammatory
tactics are impermissible.

Phillips, 144 Idaho at 87, 156 P.3d at 588.

See also State v.

Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 769, 864 P.2d 596,607 (1993); State v. Pecor, 132 Idaho 359,367,

972 P.2d 737, 745 (Ct. App. 1998). The prosecutor's closing argument should not include
disparaging comments about opposing counsel. Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86, 156 P.3d at 587. See
also Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 280, 77 P.3d at 969; State v. Brown, 131 Idaho 61, 69, 951 P.2d

1288, 1296 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Baruth, 107 Idaho 651,657, 691 P.2d 1266, 1272 (Ct. App.
1984).
While our system of criminal justice is adversarial in nature, and the prosecutor is
expected to be diligent and leave no stone unturned, he or she is nevertheless expected and
required to be fair. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007). However, in
reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct we must keep in mind the realities of trial. Id
A fair trial is not necessarily a perfect trial. Id
When there is no contemporaneous objection, a conviction will be reversed for
prosecutorial misconduct only if the conduct is sufficiently egregious so as to result in
fundamental error. Id. Prosecutorial misconduct rises to the level of fundamental error when it
is calculated to inflame the minds of jurors and arouse prejudice or passion against the defendant,
or is so inflammatory that the jurors may be influenced to determine guilt on factors outside the
evidence. State v. Kuhn, 139 Idaho 710, 715, 85 P.3d 1109, 1114 (Ct. App. 2003). Prosecutorial
misconduct rises to the level of fundamental error only if the acts or comments constituting the
misconduct are so egregious or infla.'Ilmatory that any ensuing prejudice could not have been
remedied by a curative jury instruction. Id. The rationale of this rule is that even a timely
objection to such inflammatory statements would not have cured the inherent prejudice. Id.
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However, even when prosecutorial misconduct has

fundamental error, the conviction

will not be reversed when· that error is harmless. Field, 144 Idaho at

, 165 P.3d at 285. The

test for whether prosecutorial misconduct constitutes harmless error is whether the appellate
court can conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the result of the trial would not have been
different absent the misconduct. State v. Pecor, I

Idaho 359,368,972 P.2d 737, 746 (Ct. App.

1998).
~'hen the defendant did not object at trial, our inquiry is, thus, three-tiered. See Field,
144 Idaho at 571, 165 P.3d at 285.
misconduct.

First, we determine factually if there was prosecutorial

Second, if there was prosecutorial misconduct, we determine whether the

misconduct rose to the level of fimdamental error. Third, if we conclude that it did, we then
consider whether such misconduct prejudiced the defendant's right to a fair trial or whether it
was harmless.
As to the trafficking of methamphetamine charge, the State alleged that Oser "was
knowingly in actual or constructive possession of twenty-eight (28) grams or more of
methamphetamine." In regard to constructive possession, the jury was instructed:

In order to establish possession of a controlled substance, a defendant need
not have actual physical possession of the substance. The state need only prove
that the defendant had such dominion and control over the substance to establish
constructive possession.
Constructive possession of a controlled substance exists where a nexus
between the accused and the substance is sufficiently proven so as to give rise to
the reasonable inference that the accused was not simply a bystander but rather
had the power and intent to exercise dominion and control over the substance.
Oser's appeal centers around the following statement by the prosecutor;
The only way that Mr. Oser does not have power and intention to control
this stuff is if he just doesn't even know it is there. If this is in 1vfr. Williams'
pocket and when the police knock on the door, Mr. Williams goes "Oh."
Oser contends that the above statement by the prosecutor during closing argument not only
misstated the law of constructive possession, but effectively changed the State's burden of proof
on the issue of constructive possession.

Oser characterizes the prosecutor's statement as

providing that knowledge alone is all that is required for constructive possession. We disagree.
The challenged statement, read in context of the full argument and the evidence at trial, is neither
a misstatement of the law nor a change in

State's burden of proof.

4

In his closing remarks, the prosecutor began his discussion of constructive possession by
accurately stating:
End result is, in order to convict Mr. Oser of traffi.cldi.1g, you have to be
convinced that he knew about the big packet in the computer room and he had the
power and intention to exercise domiPion and controi over it.
Next, the prosecutor discussed the difference between actual and constructive possession,
concluding:
We don't have to catch somebody with it in their coat. All we have to
prove is that you had constructive possession of it, which means that there's some
nexus between the accused and the substance that gives rise to the reasonable
inference that you're not simply a bystander, that you had the power and intention
to exercise dominion and control over the substance.
The prosecutor then attempted to apply the standard to "what was going on in Mr. Oser's home."
Leading up to the challenged statement, he referenced the elements of knowledge and the power
and intention to control in the scenarios of selling, buying and using the substance in Oser's
home. The challenged statement, placed in this context, can only be seen as a reference to Oser
not being the type of bystander discussed in the Instruction. Moreover, three more times after
the challenged statement the prosecutor refers to the evidence and its relationship to the
knowledge and the power and intention to control elements of constructive possession,
concluding: "he knew the drugs were there, and he had the power and intention to control it, and
t._11.at makes him guilty of trafficking of controlled substance as well."
Even if the statement could be construed as a misstatement of the law, its impact, if any,
did not rise to the level of changing the State's burden of proof. Not only did the prosecutor
refer to the correct statement of the burden of proof regarding constructive possession no less
than eight times during his remarks, the court admonished the jury on three occasions that the
arguments of the attorneys were not to be considered evidence and specifically advised: "[i]f
anyone states a rule of law different from any I tell you, it is my instruction that you must
follow." We presume that the jury followed the district court's instructions. See State v. Kilby,
130 Idaho 747, 751, 947 P.2d 420,424 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Hudson, 129 Idaho 478,481,
927 P.2d 451,454 (Ct. App. 1996).

5

Ill.
CONCLUSION

The prosecutor did not create error, much less fundamental error.
judgment of conviction is affirmed.
Judge PERRY and Judge GUTIERREZ, CONCUR.

6

Therefore, Oser's
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)

l

'

IN THE DISTR1CT COURT OF

2

FOURTH

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE

3

4

5
6

WILLIAM OSER,

7

Petitioner,
8

vs.

Case No. CV PC 0913550
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
DISMISSAL OF APPLICATION FOR
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

9

10
11

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

12
13

Following an investigation, the Boise police department obtained and executed a warrant to

14

search the Petitioner William Oser's residence. Subsequently, Petitioner was arrested and charged

15

with trafficking in methamphetamine or amphetamine and delivery of a controlled substance. On

16

March I 4, 2008, the Petitioner was found guilty by a jury of both charges. On April 16, 2008, the
17

Petitioner received a concurrent sentence of twenty years, with six years fixed and fourteen years
18
19

·indeterminate.Petitioner filed an Amended Appeal on May 14, 2008. ln an unreported opinion, the

20

Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. On July 20, 2009, Petitioner filed his Petition for

21

Post Conviction Relief. On September 30, 2009, the Court granted Petitioner's motion to amend his

22

petitioner. On October 8, 2009, the Court granted motions for production of transcripts and to take

23

judicial notice of the record, transcripts, and PSI in Ada County Case CRFE 2007 000474, the

24

underlying criminal case. Petitioner filed his amended petition on November 3, 2009. The State

25
26

ht
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I

, I

)

j,

J

l
1

!,filed its initiai motion for summarv dismissal on December 23, 2009. On January 7, 20 l 0, Petitioner
! sought additional time to respon.d to the motion for summary dismissal a.Dd the Court granted

z I
3

Petitioner until February 19: 20 I 0. Petitioner then filed a supplement to address the shortcomings of

4

the allegations in the Amended Petition. On April 6, 2010, the State filed a supplemental brief in

5

support of summary disposition. The Cou..rt heard oral argument on the motion for summary

6

dismissal on May 20, 2010. Jonathan Medema appeared for the State and Teri Jones appeared for

7

the Petitioner. The Court considered the matter fully under advisement at that time.
8

Petitioner's Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief asserts ineffective assistance of
10

trial counsel for failure 1) to properly lay foundation for admission of the tape recording; 2) to

11

properly object to the State's admission of photographs of the crime scene; 3) to properly conduct

12

his own investigation; 4) to discover/disclose/subpoena all of the Defendant's witnesses; and 5)

13

properly instruct Petitioner with regard to his Estrada rights prior to the presentence investigation

14

process. The State seeks summary dismissal of the Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief
arguing that Petitioner fails to present evidence establishing all the essential elements of a ciairn for

16

ineffective assistance of counsel. At the hearing, the Petitioner withdrew his fourth and fifth claims
17

which assert that counsel was ineffective for failing to discover/disclose/subpoena all of the
18

l9

Defendant's witnesses and to properly instruct Petitioner with regard to his Estrada rights prior to

20

the presentence investigation process.

21

A post-conviction action is a special proceeding that is civil in nature. Martinez v. State,

22

126 Idaho 813, 816, 892 P.2d 488, 491 (Ct. App. 1995). An application for post-conviction relief

23

differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action in that an application must contain more than

24

the short and plain statement of the claim that would suffice under a notice pleading requirement.
25

26
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J
Id. Like a civil plaintiff, the applicant must prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations
l

upon which the request for relief is based. Id. An application for post-conviction relief must
present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application

3
4
i

will be subject to dismissal. Id.

s

Summary disposition of an application for post-conviction relief is authorized by Idaho

6

Code § 19-4906. Id. Summary dismissal is permissible only if the applicant's evidence has raised

1

no genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle him to
8

the requested relief Id. If such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be
9

conducted. Id. The court is not required to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory
11

~·

allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Id. The

12

Court is also not required to accept the Petitioner's sworn statements, whether contained in an

13

affidavit or within a sworn complaint. See Kraft v. State, 100 Idaho 671, 674, 603 P.2d 1005, 1008

14
15

(1979) ("[W]hile the underlying facts must be regarded as true, the petitioner's conclusions need
not be so accepted."); see also Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App.

16

1987) (stating that courts are not required to accept petitioner's conclusory allegations).
17

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show that the
18

19

attorney's performance was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced by the deficiency.
Idaho 313,316,900 P.2d 221,224 (Ct. App. 1995). The petitioner has the

20

Hassett v. State,

21

burden of showing that the attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of

22

reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). There is a

23

strong presumption that trial counsel's performance falls within the wide range of "professional

24

assistance," Id. To establish prejudice, the applicant must show a reasonable probability that, but
25

26

000177

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR DISMISSAL OF AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF.
Page 3

for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of ti.1ie trial would have been different. Id. at
l

2

j 761,

760 P.2d at 1177. A petitioner must show that the deficient conduct so undermined the proper

3

function1ng of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just

4

result. lveyv. State, 123 Idaho 77, 80,844 P.2d 706,709 (1992).

5
6

i

The Petitioner contends that an audio tape recording captured the events of the search of his

f ! residence

and that this recording contains exculpatory evidence which tends to show that law

7

enforcement officers found no illegal substances at the residence as a result of the search.
8

Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to lay foundation for the admission
9
10

•of this tape. To prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the Petitioner must show that

11

his attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Having taken

12

judicial notice of the record of the underlying criminal case, the Court has reviewed that record.

i3

The Court finds that the admissibility of the tape was discussed at some length by the Court and

14
15

counsel at trial on March 10, March 12, and March 14, 2008. The Court reviewed the tape at that
time. The Court finds that trial counsel's representation did not fall below an objective standard of

16

reasonableness in that counsel indicated to the Court an intent to use the tape, defended the use of
17
18

the tape in the face of a motion in limine brought by the State to prohibit use of the tape, and made

19

an offer of proof. The Court also finds that Petitioner has not provided admissible evidence tending

20

to show that Ms. Mitchell would have testified to establish a foundation for the tape. Finally, the

21

Court finds Ron Shackle's affidavit makes clear that he would not have testified as asserted by

22

Petitioner that there were no drugs in the residence. The State's motion for summary dismissal of

23

Petitioner's first claim of ineffective assistance of counsel alleging that his counsel failed to

24

properly lay foundation for admission of the tape recording is GRANTED.
25
26
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The Petitioner next argues that the photographs of the scene admitted into evidence by the
1

State are contradicted by the tapes and "did not match the original photos." (Affidavit of Facts in

2

Support of Post Conviction Petition, ,rl2.) Petitioner fails to explain how the pictures are

3

contradicted by the tape or provide evidence of other photographs which contradict the
5
6

photographs admitted by the State. Petitioner seems to assert that because he believes that the
· single phrase "dry hole" on the tape means that no drugs were found, the photographs taken by the
officers at the scene of illegal substances at the residence lacked foundation. However, Petitioner's

8

memoranda and affidavit point to no failure of foundation. Petitioner has not shown that the State
9

could not have called witnesses to lay foundation for the admission of these photographs. In the

10
11.

absence of any admissible evidence as to a lack of foundation for these photographs, the Court

12

finds that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to admission of the pictures for lack

13

of foundation. The State's motion for summary dismissal of Petitioner's second claim of

14

ineffective assistance of counsel alleging that his counsel failed to properly object to the State's

15

admission of photographs of the crime scene is GRANTED.
16

Finally, Petitioner contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately
17

investigate, arguing that his counsel should have had the tape examined by an expert to identify

18

19

each voice on the tape. The Court finds that this claim is conclusory and unsupported by any

20

admissible evidence. Petitioner fails to present an affidavit from an expert attesting that such an

21

analysis would have been possible or that an expert would have been able to identify each voice.

22

Petitioner has not attempted to show that any statements on the tape would have impeached the

23

trial testimony of any of the officers. The Court does not find that failing to have such a speculative
24

analysis done falls below an objective standard of reasonableness. The State's motion for summary
25
1
26
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)

,_)

dismissal of Petitioner's third claim of ineffective assistance of counsel alieging that his counsel
l

2
3
4

failed to adequately investigate is GRANTED.
The State's Motion for Dismissal of the Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is
·oR.A.NTED.

5
6

IT IS SO ORDERED.
7

8

'7'J t,)-Dated this ebt._day of June, 2010.
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